Canadian Journal of Family Law
Volume 31
Number 1 Remembering Professor Judith
Mosoff
2018

Are You My Mother? Parentage in a Nonconjugal Family
Natasha Bakht
Lynda M. Collins

Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.allard.ubc.ca/can-j-fam-l
Part of the Family Law Commons, and the Law and Society Commons

Recommended Citation
Natasha Bakht and Lynda M. Collins, "Are You My Mother? Parentage in a Nonconjugal Family" (2018)
31:1 Can J Fam L 105.

The University of British Columbia (UBC) grants you a license to use this article under the Creative Commons
Attribution- NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0) licence. If you wish to use this
article or excerpts of the article for other purposes such as commercial republication, contact UBC via the
Canadian Journal of Family Law at cdnjfl@interchange.ubc.ca

ARE YOU MY MOTHER?
PARENTAGE IN A NONCONJUGAL
FAMILY
Natasha Bakht and Lynda M. Collins
INTRODUCTION
Two women friends and their son made national 1 and
international2 headlines when a court in Ontario declared


We are grateful for the invaluable research assistance provided by
Vanessa Baker-Murray and the kind, creative genius of our lawyer,
Marta Siemiarczuk. Thanks also to Professor Vanessa Gruben and the
anonymous peer reviewers for their insightful comments.

1

See e.g. “How Two Friends Fought to Be Legal ‘Co-Mommas’ to a 7Year-Old Boy—and Won”, CBC Radio (21 February 2017), online:
<www.cbc.ca/radio>; Julie Ireton, “Raising Elaan: Profoundly
Disabled Boy’s ‘Co-Mommas’ Make Legal History”, CBC News (21
February 2017), online: <www.cbc.ca/news>; CTVNews.ca Staff,
“Groundbreaking Family: Two Women, One Boy and a Legal
Precedent”,
CTV
News
(21
February
2017),
online:
<www.ctvnews.ca>; Ashley Csanady, “Meet the Co-Mommas:
Women who Are Partners in Raising a Son, but Not Romantic
Partners”, National Post (4 April 2017), online: <nationalpost.com>.

2

See e.g. Tanveer Mann, “Two Best Friends Make Legal History by
Becoming First to Co-Parent”, Metro (24 February 2017), online:
<metro.co.uk>; Radhika Sanghani, “Child-Sharing: Meet the Best
Friends Who’ve Legally Adopted Together”, The Telegraph (31 March
2017), online: <www.telegraph.co.uk>; Hayley Jones, “Want to Raise
Kids with Your BFF? Move to Canada”, Daily Beast (27 March 2017),
online: <www.thedailybeast.com>; Paromita Chakrabarti, “How I Met
Your Mother”, The Indian Express (9 April 2017), online:
<indianexpress.com>; Jan Bruck, “Best Friends Become First to CoParent in Canada”, BBC News (22 March 2017), online:
<www.bbc.com/news>; Monica Coviello, “La mia migliore amica è
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that Lynda Collins was the parent of then six-year-old
Elaan Bakht, the biological child of her friend, Natasha
Bakht. Their story (our story) seemed to touch the hearts of
many people around the world who were open to and
interested in yet another family form that defies the
traditional heteronormative, nuclear model. 3 Our case
diventata mamma di mio figlio”, Vanity Fair (22 March 2017), online:
<www.vanityfair.it>; Eva Wiseman “Why Shouldn’t the Modern
Family Be a Team Effort?”, The Guardian (26 March 2017), online:
<www.theguardian.com/internaitonal>; Radhika Sanghani, “Platonic
Parenting—Is This the Way of the Future?”, The West Australian (13
April 2017), online: <thewest.com.au>; Gemma Saura, “Elaan y sus
madres amigas”m La Vanguardia (24 June 2017), online:
<www.lavanguardia.com>.
3

See Outlook, BBC World Service, “’We make a good team . . .’” (21
March
2017),
posted
on
Outlook,
BBC
World
Service,
online:
Facebook
<www.facebook.com/BBCOutlook/posts/10155101845682902>;
BBC News, “Meet Natasha Bakht and Lynda Collins.” (25 March
2017),
posted
on
BBC
News,
online:
Facebook
<www.facebook.com/bbcnews/videos/1391064667623263/?autoplay
_reason=user_settings&video_container_type=0&video_creator_prod
uct_type=0&app_id=273465416184080&live_video_guests=0>. See
also Lynda Collins & Natasha Bakht, “Attention, Canadian Singles:
Why Not Raise a Child with Your Best Friend?”, CBC (8 May 2017),
online: <www.cbc.ca>; E-mail from Laila Malik to Natasha Bakht and
Lynda Collins (24 March 2017):
I wanted to write this quick note in the thick of the
various news pieces about your family that have
been circulating recently, just to add my deep
appreciation of all three of you and the joy,
wonder and radical impact you’re having on the
world. I imagine that for the most part, you’re just
doing you, but in the very conservative spaces that
I sometimes occupy I’m seeing flickers of light
that I’ve never seen in reaction to the ways you’re
paving . . . I’ve watched the BBC vid several times
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began because we found ourselves co-parenting, yet not
cohabiting, and were quite simply concerned for the future
of Elaan, who has multiple and complex disabilities. We
sought an order that would secure Elaan’s existing
relationship with Lynda and ensure Lynda’s equality with
other parents.4
A critique of patriarchal, heteronormative family
forms has always been central to feminist and critical
Queer theoretical approaches to law in general and family
law in particular. 5 Feminist scholars have argued
convincingly that traditional common law approaches to
the family have privileged white, able-bodied, middleclass, heterosexual families (and white, able-bodied,
middle-class, heterosexual men in particular). Our case
broke new legal ground, but would almost certainly never
have happened were it not for the decades of work of
countless advocates for alternative family forms, including
those involving single parents, same-sex couples, multigenerational families, and parents who make use of
reproductive technologies. There can be little doubt that

now, and am watching people I know to be very
resistant to anything other than dominant,
patriarchal narratives of family pause and think.
Historic indeed, in ways perceptible and
imperceptible.
4

See Application for Declaration of Parentage, Collins/Bakht
(Affidavit of Natasha Bakht at para 17) [Bakht Affidavit]; Application
for Declaration of Parentage, Collins/Bakht (Affidavit of Lynda
Collins at paras 19, 20–29) [Collins Affidavit].

5

See Fiona Kelly, Transforming Law’s Family: The Legal Recognition
of Planned Lesbian Motherhood (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2011).
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our success was made possible by the waves of Charter6
and family law litigation by these communities, which
prepared the Ontario Superior Court to be open to a family
structure that was previously unknown to Canadian law. In
our particular context, we also benefited from the disability
rights movement and the many parents who fought for the
right of children with disabilities to be raised at home by
their families.7
In Part I of this article, we introduce our unique
parenting partnership: We are friends who do not cohabit,
but are raising our son, Elaan (who has complex
disabilities), together. We explain how and why our family
came into existence. In Part II, we delineate the legal
arguments we made in order to formalize our relationship,
specifically, how Lynda was declared Elaan’s parent. Our
declaration of parentage argument was grounded in the
Court’s inherent parens patriae jurisdiction. We posit that
it was in Elaan’s best interests to have Lynda declared a
second parent, that there was a legislative gap in the

6

Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution
Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11
[Charter].

7

Convention on the Rights of the Child, GA Res 44/25, UNGAOR, 44th
Sess, Supp No 49, UN Doc A/44/49 (1989) 166 at 167–68 (arts 2, 8).
See also Mitchell L Yell et al, “The Legal History of Special
Education: What a Long, Strange Trip It’s Been!” (1998) 19:4
Remedial & Special Education 219 at 220. Regrettably, care at home
is not the universal reality for children with disabilities around the
world. See Georgette Mulheir, “Deinstitutionalisation: A Human
Rights Priority for Children with Disabilities” (2012)
9
Equal
Rights
Rev
117, online:
<
www.equalrightstrust.org/ertdocumentbank/err9_mulheir.pdf>.
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Children’s Law Reform Act 8 that permitted the Court to
make the declaration, and that our nonconjugal status was
not a legal impediment to the declaration.9
In our view, it is always in a child’s best interests
to have all the emotional, financial, and pragmatic support
necessary to meet his or her needs. It is, similarly, always
in a child’s best interest to ensure that his or her custodial
parent has all the support that she or he needs. There are a
number of ways to accomplish these twin goals, drawing
on various sources of support including family, friends, and
state assistance. Often, and particularly in the cases of
children born with unanticipated special needs, it takes
time and experimentation to determine how best to meet a
child’s needs and those of her custodial parent. In Elaan’s
case, we found that his needs were best met through a
combination of support from his biological mother, his
non-biological mother, extended family, privately-funded
care, and state support in the form of in-home assistance
and access to a superb special-needs school. All of these
pieces were, and are, necessary to ensure his well-being.
Thus, in his case, it is accurate to say that legal recognition
8

RSO 1990, c C 12 [CLRA].

9

Conversely, a conjugal relationship with the biological or adopted
parent should not be determinative of parental status. The Alberta
Court of Appeal reached an opposite conclusion in Doe v Alberta, 2007
ABCA 50, 278 DLR (4th) 1, where the biological mother entered into
an express written agreement with her cohabiting male partner (who
did not father the child), which stipulated that the partner had neither
parental rights nor any obligation to support the child. For an insightful
analysis of the Court’s reliance on the traditional nuclear family to
impose parental status on the basis of spousal status, see Brenda
Cossman, “Parenting Beyond the Nuclear Family: Doe v. Alberta”
(2007) 45:2 Alta L Rev 501.
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and protection of his second parent was in his best interests.
We would not wish to suggest that this conclusion can be
generalized to other families. Clearly, children can thrive
in a single-parent family, supported by friends, family, and
public services. Certainly, courts should be careful not to
favour heteronormative two-parent households, resisting
the temptation to “find fathers” 10 for children where
parenthood does not actually exist. This assessment must
necessarily be made on a case-by-case basis.
In Part III of the article, we describe Ontario’s new
All Families are Equal Act, 11 including restrictions that
might have prevented our family from being recognized
had our case been heard a few weeks later than it was. We
argue that loving parental relationships can be created in a
myriad of ways and that courts must have the ability to
examine new family formations in keeping with changing
social realities and to protect the best interests of children
in unique situations. The emergence of new family forms
involving same-sex couples and those who use
reproductive technologies (among other permutations) has
already disrupted centuries-old definitions of what it means
to be a family. At the same time, the creation of new nonnormative families has opened up space for a recognition
that the patriarchal nuclear family has never been the norm

10

Susan B Boyd et al, Autonomous Motherhood?: A Socio-Legal Study
of Choice and Constraint (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2015)
at 30.

11

An Act to amend the Children’s Law Reform Act, the Vital Statistics
Act and various other Acts respecting parentage and related
registrations, SO 2016, c 23 [All Families are Equal Act].
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in many socio-cultural communities. 12 Indeed, “[t]he
traditional family structure remains significantly more
prevalent among middle or upper class white
individuals.”13 Thus, a legal regime that only recognizes
traditional families will disadvantage vulnerable children,
including racialized children and those with complex
disabilities. Finally, in Part IV, we examine historical and
contemporary examples of nonconjugal parenting. We
argue that a child’s right to be loved must not be limited by
his or her parents’ marital/cohabiting status, sexual
relationship, or, indeed, when the parental relationship
came into existence. We conclude that the state should
support any and all relationships that have the capacity to
further loving and happy homes for all children.
PART I: LOVE MAKES A FAMILY (OUR STORY)
We are both professors in the Faculty of Law at the
University of Ottawa. We have been friends and colleagues
for more than a decade, but we are not “spouses” 14 or a
same-sex couple.15 We do not cohabit together, although
we do reside in vertically adjacent units in the same
condominium. We have, since Elaan was a baby, coparented him. In some respects, we treat our two units as
the upstairs and downstairs of a shared family home. In
12

See Stephanie Coontz, Marriage, a History: From Obedience to
Intimacy or How Love Conquered Marriage (New York: Viking,
2005) at 24–31.

13

Jessica R Feinberg, “Friends as Co-Parents” (2009) 43:4 USF L Rev
799 at 814.

14

See Family Law Act, RSO 1990, c F-3, s 1(1) [FLA].

15

See Bakht Affidavit, supra note 4 at paras 1, 3, 4; Collins Affidavit,
supra note 4 at para 1.
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other ways, we co-parent Elaan like any other parents who
do not reside together.16 Our unique living situation defies
easy categorization; some might call us sui generis, but we
consider ourselves a family that shares unconditional love,
trust, and consistent care as our foundation.
Natasha made the decision in 2009 to become a
single mother by choice,17 using anonymous donor sperm.
Over the course of her pregnancy, Lynda offered to become
Natasha’s birth coach.18 Lynda was present at Elaan’s birth
and was the first person other than the surgeon to see him.
We imagined that Lynda would be a significant person in
Elaan’s life, but we did not intend, at that time, for her to
become his parent.
About six months after Elaan’s birth, it became
clear that he was not meeting typical developmental
milestones. After several tests, Elaan was diagnosed with
periventricular leukomalacia, 19 which eventually resulted
16

This may include separated or divorced couples who raise children
together, multiple-parent families who agree in advance to raise
children in different households, or some other family variation we
have not thought of. In terms of our living arrangement, Elaan lives
and sleeps in Natasha’s unit, but he often spends time in Lynda’s unit
where some of his clothes, feeding supplies, toys, books, and adaptive
equipment can also be found.

17

See Boyd, supra note 10 at 14–15.

18

See Bakht Affidavit, supra note 4 at paras 3, 5; Collins Affidavit, supra
note 4 at para 5.

19

“Periventricular leukomalacia (PVL) is a type of brain injury affecting
infants. The condition involves the death of small areas of brain tissue
around fluid-filled areas called ventricles. The damage creates ‘holes’
in the brain. ‘Leuko’ refers to the brain’s white matter.
‘Periventricular’ refers to the area around the ventricles”:
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in the more specific diagnoses of complex cerebral palsy,
spastic quadriplegia, cortical visual impairment, asthma,
epilepsy, acid reflux, and sleep apnea. Elaan is non-verbal,
though his comprehension is very good. He communicates
by using a head-operated switch device and by answering
“yes” with his smile. He requires assistance with all
activities of daily living including mobility, dressing,
toileting, and eating. He is fed through a gastric tube and
uses a variety of adaptive equipment including a
wheelchair, a wheeled walker, a standing frame, and
various types of specialized seating. He is a bright, joyful,
and beautiful little boy who adores music, school, and the
outdoors. Elaan needs 24-hour care and will continue to
need such care for the rest of his life.20
Very quickly following Elaan’s birth, Lynda’s role
as an important “aunty” in his life turned to that of a daily
caregiver alongside Natasha, her role increasing over time
to the point where she became a second mother to him.
Lynda is intimately involved in all areas of Elaan’s daily
“Periventricular Leukomalacia” Medline Plus (6 November 2017),
online: <https://medlineplus.gov/ency/article/007232.htm>.
20

See Bakht Affidavit, supra note 4 at para 25; Collins Affidavit, supra
note 4 at para 11; Application for Declaration of Parentage,
Collins/Bakht (Affidavit of Dr. Anne Rowan-Legg at paras 2–3)
[Rowan-Legg Affidavit]. The enumeration of Elaan’s medical issues
in this way can sound daunting and even reductionist. We are very
conscious that Elaan is much more than a list of his medical diagnoses.
As parents, we feel privileged to have his joyous spirit; he is teaching
us so much about what is important in life. However, we needed the
Court to understand the details of raising a child with multiple complex
disabilities—and the increased caregiving responsibilities this
involves—in order to make the case that having a second parent was in
Elaan’s best interests.
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life.21 When he was just a year old, Lynda sold her threebedroom house to move into Natasha’s condominium
building so that she could help to raise Elaan more
conveniently on a daily basis.22
Lynda and Natasha share all child rearing,
including day-to-day obligations relating to Elaan, such as
feeding him, dressing him, bathing him, attending to his
school work and social life, attending to his medical care
and therapies, and all other regular and major aspects of
child rearing.23 Lynda and Natasha, along with Elaan, eat
meals and shop together, visit families and friends together,
nurse Elaan’s hurts together, and plan for his future
together. 24 We share in Elaan’s financial support 25 and
coordinate our teaching schedules so that one of us is
always available to care for Elaan should he be ill or have
a doctor’s appointment. 26 Most importantly, Lynda and
Elaan share a deep loving bond that is characteristic of a
parental relationship. Though he cannot express his
feelings verbally, Elaan’s responses and interactions
demonstrate that he experiences Lynda as one of his
parents. 27 Natasha also treats Lynda as a co-parent,
21

See Bakht Affidavit, supra note 4 at paras 18–23; Collins Affidavit,
supra note 4 at paras 3, 9, 13, 16.

22

See Collins Affidavit, supra note 4 at paras 14, 19–20.

23

See Bakht Affidavit, supra note 4 at paras 24–36; Ibid at paras 20–29.

24

See Bakht Affidavit, supra note 4 at para 17; Collins Affidavit, supra
note 4 at paras 16, 20, 63.

25

See Collins Affidavit, supra note 4 at paras 61–63.

26

See Bakht Affidavit, supra note 4 at para 43.

27

See ibid at paras 23, 38.
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involving her in all aspects of decision making regarding
Elaan’s medical care, nutrition, schooling, recreation, and
therapies.28
Eventually, we sought to have our de facto
parenting arrangement recognized in law. This was
important to us for a number of reasons. For Natasha, it was
about peace of mind. Given Elaan’s specialized needs for
care and support, which will only increase as he grows
older, knowing that Elaan had another legal parent to rely
on was reassuring. Having Lynda as a second parent would
ensure that Elaan would be eligible for her medical
insurance benefits and the disabled dependents provisions
of her pension, that he could inherit on intestacy, and that
he would have another person legally required to meet his
needs
physically,
emotionally, spiritually,
and
financially.29 “For Lynda, it was about being able to say to
doctors and teachers (and anyone who would listen!) ‘this
is my son!’”30 But a formal recognition of her parentage
would also ensure that Lynda could consent to medical
treatment, register Elaan in school, claim him as a
dependent for any tax purposes, and make decisions
regarding his education and moral upbringing. Without the
formal recognition of her parentage, if any authority were
to question Lynda’s legal relationship to Elaan, she would
have none other than that of a “babysitter”. We also felt it
was important to honour the relationship that had grown so
organically
between Lynda and Elaan
and
to
28

See ibid at paras 2, 17–18, 37–45; Collins Affidavit, supra note 4 at
paras 57–58.

29

See A(A) v B(B), 2007 ONCA 2 at para 14, 83 OR (3d) 561.

30

Collins & Bakht, supra note 3.
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simultaneously challenge the historic hegemony of
marriage and “one-size-fits-all models of parenting.”31
PART II: A FAMILY MAKES LAW
In April 2016, we filed an application 32 with the
Superior Court of Justice, Family Court, seeking a
declaration of parentage for Lynda.33 We filed affidavits34
outlining our position that Elaan’s best interests would be
served with legal recognition of Lynda’s role in his life.
Our Application was filed as a “basket motion” (or
unopposed motion) and thus, we were not required—
though we were prepared—to submit a factum. We would
have argued that the Court should use its inherent parens
31

Ibid.

32

We sought an application for a declaration of parentage pursuant to
section 4 of the CLRA, supra note 8. Section 4 of the CLRA states:
“Any person having an interest may apply to a court for a declaration
that a male person is recognized in law to be the father of a child or
that a female person is the mother of a child” (ibid). However, because
the CLRA was interpreted to permit a child to have only one male
parent and one female parent (see Rutherford v Ontario (Deputy
Registrar General) (2006), 81 OR (3d) 81 at para 102, 270 DLR (4th)
90 (Ont Sup Ct) [Rutherford v Ontario]; A(A) v B(B), supra note 29 at
para 34), we were, in fact, asking the Court to invoke its parens patriae
jurisdiction to fulfill our request.

33

We also sought an order for joint custodial rights of Elaan with respect
to major decisions about his care and upbringing under the CLRA
(recognizing that this alone would not accurately reflect Lynda’s true
role in Elaan’s life as his mother) and an order amending Elaan’s birth
certificate under the Vital Statistics Act, RSO 1990, c V 4, to show both
Natasha Bakht and Lynda Collins as parents of Elaan. See Application
for Declaration of Parentage, Collins/Bakht, supra note 4 at paras 1–
4.

34

See Bakht Affidavit, supra note 4; Collins Affidavit, supra note 4.
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patriae jurisdiction to grant the declaration because: (a) it
would be in Elaan’s best interests to do so; (b) there was a
legislative gap in the Children’s Law Reform Act; and (c)
nonconjugality is not a legal impediment to the proposed
declaration.
(A) ELAAN’S BEST INTERESTS
In our application and draft factum, we argued that it was
in Elaan’s best interests to have Lynda’s role as his parent
legally recognized through a declaration of parentage.
Because his needs for care and support are profound, and
because as he gets older, meeting his needs physically,
emotionally, and financially will become even more
challenging, having two legal parents would be a
significant benefit to him.
The Child and Family Services Act 35 precluded
Lynda from adopting Elaan because she is not a
“relative”36 by blood or marriage. Natasha would have had
to give up her parental rights to Elaan in order for Lynda to
adopt him, which was not what we wanted. We were also
unable to make use of the simplified step-parent adoption
route as we were not in a conjugal relationship.37 The fact
that marital status was the only hurdle preventing us from
accessing the step-parent adoption provisions in the CFSA
is discriminatory and almost certainly unconstitutional, but
35

RSO 1990, c C 11 [CFSA].

36

See ibid, ss 3(1), 141(8).

37

See ibid, s 158(2)(b). See also Shelley AM Gavigan, “Legal Forms,
Family Forms, Gendered Norms: What Is a Spouse?” (1999) 14:1
CJLS 127 at 156.
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we opted not to pursue this legal route. Because the future
care of a child with disabilities like Elaan’s is exorbitantly
expensive,38 we felt it would be financially irresponsible to
spend the amount of money needed to constitutionally
challenge the legislation.39 A declaration of parentage, as
the Ontario Court of Appeal noted in A.(A.) v. B.(B.),
“provides practical and symbolic recognition of the parentchild relationship”, 40 conferring the same rights and
obligations as those of biological or adoptive parents.41
As in A.(A.) v. B.(B.), 42 we believe it was
significant that Natasha, Elaan’s biological parent,
supported the application for the declaration of parentage.43
38

See Donna Anderson et al, “The Personal Costs of Caring for a Child
with a Disability: A Review of the Literature” (2007) 122:1 Public
Health Reports 3 at 7.

39

See “How Much Does a Family Lawyer Cost?”, Fine & Associates
(blog), online: <www.torontodivorcelaw.com/family-lawyer-cost/>.

40

Supra note 29 at para 15.

41

In particular, a declaration of parentage: confers “all the rights and
obligations of a custodial parent”; “determines lineage”; “is a lifelong
immutable declaration of status”; “allows the parent to fully participate
in the child’s life”; “ensures that the child will inherit on intestacy”;
allows the declared parent to “obtain an OHIP [Ontario Health
Insurance Plan] card, a social insurance number, airline tickets and
passports for the child”; allows the declared parent to “register the child
in school”; would require the declared parent’s consent for any future
adoption; and allows the declared parent to “assert her rights under
various laws, such as the Health Care Consent Act, 1996, S.O. 1996,
c. 2, Sched. A.”: ibid at para 14.

42

See supra note 29 at paras 4, 14.

43

In DLC v GES, 2006 SKCA 79 at para 61, 270 DLR (4th) 597, the
Court articulated “a deep social and legal norm which presumes that fit
parents generally act in their children’s best interests.” As the Court
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However, we are not of the view that this should be
determinative. In our case, Natasha’s support of the
application showed that a loving and capable parent and the
person who knows Elaan best also trusted the applicant to
care for her child like a parent. The ultimate question,
however, ought to be whether a declaration of parentage is
in the child’s best interests.44 This might include an inquiry
into whether the parent seeking the declaration has a
parental relationship with the child, whether there is love
and affection between the child and the applicant parent,
the length of time that the parent-like relationship has
existed, the ability and willingness of the proposed parent
to provide for the child, the child’s preferences, if
ascertainable, 45 and the relationship between the legallynoted, “[i]t also reflects a fundamental corollary view that a fit parent’s
assessment of a child’s best interests should not be lightly interfered
with” (ibid).
44

Because human relationships are multifaceted, complicated, and
dynamic, there should be no presumption that a specific relationship
between an adult and a child does not give rise to the possibility of the
adult being found to be a parent. The appropriate approach is to closely
examine the realities of the relationship and all of its circumstances.
We believe, however, that the custodial parent’s views should be given
very substantial weight and careful consideration in determining the
best interests of the child. As the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal noted
in DLC v GES, “[s]ingle parents, in particular, often need assistance
from friends and others in caring for their children. Those caregivers
will frequently develop a strong attachment to the children and vice
versa. But . . . it would be a serious overstep to impose courtsanctioned visiting rights as a consequence of such relationships”: ibid
at para 65.

45

These indicia of a parental relationship are comparable to section 24(2)
of the CLRA, supra note 8, which directs judges hearing custody or
access applications to consider the needs and circumstances of the
child.
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recognized parent and the applicant parent.46 This would
be a context-dependent, fact-specific inquiry that puts the
child’s interests first. Importantly, a best interests inquiry
must not import questionable biases such as a desire for
children to be raised in an environment that most closely
resembles the traditional heteronormative family. Because
the courts’ parens patriae jurisdiction is fundamentally
about protecting the interests of vulnerable children, it
allows courts to craft individualized remedies for unique
situations.
In our case, to establish that it was in Elaan’s best
interests to have Lynda declared a parent, we gathered
affidavits from friends, family members, and Elaan’s
professional caregivers to testify to the vital parental role
that Lynda plays in Elaan’s life, and that the family is
healthy, happy, and functioning well. Elaan’s paediatrician
since 2012, Dr. Anne Rowan-Legg, who observed Lynda
and Elaan on multiple occasions in both clinic and hospital
settings, stated in her affidavit:

46

With respect to this final criterion, if the relationship between the
legally-recognized parent and the applicant parent is particularly
antagonistic, it may well not be in the best interests of the child for the
declaration of parentage to be granted. For example, in Buist v Greaves,
the Court denied an application for declaration of parentage where the
biological mother opposed it and there was a high “level of suspicion,
misunderstanding and difficulty . . . permeat[ing] the current
relationship” between the parties: [1997] OJ No 2646 at 10, 11 OFLR
3 (Ont Ct J (Gen Div)). In that case, the child did not consider the
Applicant his mother and the Applicant had drafted and commissioned
an affidavit confirming the biological mother was the child’s sole
parent (see ibid at 16–17).
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[Lynda] presents as a responsible and loving
parental figure for Elaan . . . I have had the
opportunity to care for many children with
complex medical needs. . . . I feel that I can,
through this professional role, attest to some
of the specific qualities of parents that are
able to care for children with special needs.
The role takes incredible patience,
commitment, creativity (to troubleshoot
difficult
situations),
unflappability,
optimism, confidence, and deep love. I have
seen all of these qualities, amongst many
others, in both Lynda and Natasha. They are
remarkable individuals, and an even stronger
team. . . .
Given Elaan’s complex medical needs, and
the joy he clearly derives from his close bond
with Lynda, I believe that it is in Elaan’s best
interests that Lynda be recognized as his legal
parent. This will give Lynda the opportunity
to participate fully in medical decisionmaking for Elaan, and will ensure that Elaan
enjoys the physical, financial and
psychological support of two legal parents.47
Like Dr. Rowan-Legg, Anne Levesque, a disability
rights lawyer and friend of the Bakht-Collins family, also
observed that Lynda and Natasha form a strong parental
unit for this uniquely vulnerable child. Ms. Levesque
noted:

47

Rowan-Legg Affidavit, supra note 20 at paras 4, 8, 10.
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As a human rights lawyer, I have served as a
member and chair of the Human Rights
Committee of the Council of Canadians with
Disabilities—Canada’s largest disability
rights and advocacy group—for nearly a
decade. Based on my experience, two of the
greatest barriers facing persons with
disabilities in Canada are poverty and social
exclusion. In my view, Lynda’s Application
for a Declaration of Parentage, if granted,
will help Elaan overcome these two
important barriers.48
Finally, the evidence of Leslie Walker, Principal of
Elaan’s school at the Ottawa Children’s Treatment Centre,
was also strongly supportive of the Application. Ms.
Walker stated:
Having observed hundreds of families during
my years in special needs education, I would
say that Lynda, Natasha and Elaan present as
a loving and effective family unit. Lynda is
clearly intimately involved with every aspect
of Elaan’s life and she demonstrates an
obvious interest in and dedication to his
education. Lynda works actively with our
team to maximize Elaan’s progress and
wellbeing and is clearly committed to him as
a parent. Elaan in turn clearly derives joy,

48

Application for Declaration of Parentage, Collins/Bakht (Affidavit of
Anne Levesque at paras 5, 10).
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love and a sense of security from Lynda’s
presence in his life.49
Parents of children with complex disabilities face
significant risks of caregiver burn-out and physical injury
throughout the lifetime of their children.50 By granting the
declaration, we argued that the Court would be serving
Elaan’s best interests, both directly and indirectly, by
providing an additional level of legal security and
assurance to his biological parent. Parents of children with
complex disabilities are often particularly in need of
support because of the dramatic financial and emotional
impact of raising and supporting these kids in a society that
is not responsive to their various needs. In such a context,
state support is clearly critical to ensure that both the
caregiver and the child are given the assistance needed to
thrive. 51 However, recognizing more parents can also
introduce the potential for creating more financial
49

Application for Declaration of Parentage, Collins/Bakht (Affidavit of
Leslie Walker at paras 8–9).

50

See generally NA Murphy et al, “The Health of Caregivers for
Children with Disabilities: Caregiver Perspectives” (2006) 33:2 Child
180, online: Pub Med <www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/17291322>.
See also S Matthew Liao, The Right to Be Loved (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2015) at 138–139, who argues that “the duty to
promote a child’s being loved gives us further reasons to promote the
primary dutybearers’ welfare, health, psychological well-being, and so
on, through generous welfare policies.”

51

See Karen Syma Czapanskiy, “Chalimony: Seeking Equity between
Parents of Children with Disabilities and Chronic Illnesses” (2010)
34:2 NYU Rev L & Soc Change 253 at 254–255. See also Christine
Dobby, “Whose Responsibility? Disabled Adult ‘Children of the
Marriage’ under the Divorce Act and the Canadian Social Welfare
State” (2005) 20 Windsor Rev Legal Soc Issues 41.
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support,52 more hands-on care, and more comfort, which
will tend to be in a child’s best interests.
Elaan revels in playing and spending time with his
family. He recognizes Lynda as his parent and knows he
can depend on her to care for him. Though the legal
declaration would make no practical difference to our daily
lived reality from Elaan’s perspective, we took the position
that it was in his best interests to have Lynda’s role as his
parent legally recognized. It was important for “law to
catch up with life”.53
(B) FILLING THE LEGISLATIVE GAP IN THE
CLRA
It is well established that courts may exercise their parens
patriae jurisdiction to fill a legislative gap, including in the
context of declarations of parentage. 54 In this case, a
surprising gap in the CLRA allowed the Court to invoke
parens patriae. Despite more than two decades of Charter
jurisprudence on same-sex family rights, the CLRA did not
allow the issuance of a declaration of parentage where it
would result in a child having two mothers or two fathers.55
This anomaly was patently inconsistent with contemporary
Canadian values and Charter jurisprudence, and
52

“In contrast to many traditional families where only one parent
contributes financially to the household,” two friends may provide
greater economic stability to a child where the family consists of “two
financially independent individuals”: Feinberg, supra note 13 at 815.

53

E-mail from Angela Cameron to Natasha Bakht and Lynda Collins (17
November 2016).

54

See A(A) v B(B), supra note 29 at para 7.

55

See Rutherford v Ontario, supra note 32 at para 102.
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demonstrated the existence of a legislative gap in the
statute. As the Court of Appeal held in A.(A.) v. B.(B.):
The purpose of the legislation was to declare
that all children should have equal status. At
the time, equality of status meant recognizing
the equality of children born inside and
outside of marriage. The legislature had in
mind traditional unions between one mother
and one father. It did not legislate in relation
to other types of relationships because those
relationships and the advent of reproductive
technology were beyond the vision of the
Law Reform Commission and the legislature
of the day.56
Similarly,
the
social
and
technological
developments that lead two female friends to raise a child
together were not contemplated by the legislature in
drafting the CLRA. The CLRA was intended to promote the
equality of all children but failed to keep pace with changes
in society. The Court of Appeal explained:
Present social conditions and attitudes have
changed. Advances in our appreciation of the
value of other types of relationships and in
the science of reproductive technology have
created gaps in the CLRA’s legislative
scheme. Because of these changes the parents
of a child can be two women or two men.
They are as much the child’s parents as
adopting parents or “natural” parents. The
56

Supra note 29 at para 34.
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CLRA, however, does not recognize these
forms of parenting and thus the children of
these relationships are deprived of the
equality of status that declarations of
parentage provide.57
Following the lead of the litigants in A.(A.) v.
B.(B.), we sought a declaration of parentage under the
CLRA, knowing that (as in that case) the Court would likely
decline because of the clear precedent stating that the
CLRA precluded such a declaration when it would result in
a child having two mothers. We then expected the Court,
as it did in A.(A.) v. B.(B.), to resort to its parens patriae
jurisdiction to fill this obvious gap in the legislative
scheme. Since the Court’s order actually issued the
declaration pursuant to the CLRA and there were no
reasons provided in our case, 58 the use of the parens
patriae jurisdiction remains unclear in our case.
However, even if there was no legislative gap in the
CLRA, in our view, the Court would be justified in
exercising its parens patriae jurisdiction in order to fulfill
the Act’s paramount objective. 59 Without the Court’s
intervention, the legislation actually becomes selfdefeating, undermining rather than promoting Elaan’s
57

Ibid at para 35.

58

The court order states: “Lynda Margaret Collins is a parent of the child,
Elaan Das Bakht, born February 9, 2010 and that Lynda Margaret
Collins shall be recognized in law as a parent of Elaan Das Bakht
pursuant to section 4 of the Children’s Law Reform Act.”

59

In A(A) v B(B), supra note 29 at para 20, the Court of Appeal said the
purpose of the CLRA was to declare that all children should have equal
status.
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equality and best interests. Here, the legislative gap was
clear and had already been elucidated by the Court of
Appeal in A.(A.) v. B.(B.).60
(C) NONCONJUGALITY IS NOT A LEGAL
IMPEDIMENT TO A DECLARATION OF
PARENTAGE
Finally, our draft factum argued that nothing in the CLRA
or the jurisprudence prevents the court from issuing a
declaration of parentage in a nonconjugal context. The
CLRA permits courts to recognize nonbiological or social
parents where the parent-child relationship has been
established on a balance of probabilities. 61 As the court
held in A.W.M. v. T.N.S.: “In these changing times, court
decisions on [declarations of] parentage focus less on the
biological connection between child and parent and more
on the substance of the relationship.” 62 Moreover, “the
declaration made . . . is not that the applicant is a child’s
natural parent, but that he or she is recognized in law to be
the father or mother of the child.”63
In Low v. Low,64 for example, the Court granted a
declaration of parentage to the nonbiological father of a
child born through artificial insemination, though the
applicant’s marriage to the child’s mother had broken
down some four years before the judgment. Similarly, in
60

See ibid at paras 38–40.

61

See supra note 8, s 13(3).

62

2014 ONSC 5420 at para 24, 54 RFL (7th) 155.

63

A(A) v B(B), supra note 29 at para 32.

64

(1994), 114 DLR (4th) 709, 4 RFL (4th) 103 (Ont Ct J (Gen Div)).
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D.W.H. v. D.J.R., 65 the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench
granted a declaration of parentage to the gay, nonbiological
father of a child, where the applicant had never been in a
conjugal relationship with the child’s lesbian mother and
was no longer in a conjugal relationship with the child’s
biological father. The Court held that “[i]t [was] contrary
to the best interests of the child S. to be limited to the legal
recognition of a sole parent”.66 The trial Court in A.(A.) v.
B.(B.) noted that “[r]ecognition of parentage under the
CLRA does not depend upon marital status.”67
In the recent case of B.C.P. and L.P. v. A.R.P.,68
Justice Kiteley aptly observed:
Having heard many applications for
declarations of parentage, these cases reflect
the diversity of circumstances that are
presented. . . . where a single person (without
a domestic partner) is impregnated using
[Assisted Reproductive Technologies] . . .
and other permutations and combinations in
the straight and LGBTQ communities.69
Here, the Court clearly recognized the wide number
of situations that may lead to declarations of parentage
being sought, suggesting courts’ openness to alternative
parenting arrangements in the face of a changing society.
65

2011 ABQB 608, aff’d 2013 ABCA 240, 364 DLR (4th) 420.

66

Ibid at para 139.

67

(2003), 225 DLR (4th) 371 at para 16, 38 RFL (5th) 1 (Ont Sup Ct).

68

2016 ONSC 4518, 87 RFL (7th) 219.

69

Ibid at para 8 [emphasis added].
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For all practical purposes, Lynda and Natasha are
in an analogous position to ex-spouses who are functioning
effectively in co-parenting their child. The fact that a
conjugal union never existed between us is immaterial to
the best interests of Elaan—the raison d’être of the CLRA.
“A person’s ability to love and offer emotional support to
a child depends on his or her personality traits (such as
empathy, sympathy, understanding, and kindness) and has
no logical connection to that individual’s marital or
relationship status.” 70 Indeed an analysis that focuses on
the conjugal (or nonconjugal) nature of the relationship
between the parents and fails to focus on each parent’s
relationship with the child and their ability to co-parent
simply misses the mark.
In terms of parenting ability, there is no logical
reason to privilege sexual connections over all others. In
fact, to do so would be to fail to offer much needed support
to more vulnerable families, particularly those raising
children with disabilities. An insistence on conjugality also
disregards and discourages the myriad ways in which
people exchange love and care.71 If law is to remain neutral
among the various visions of the good life, 72 it must be
open to alternative family formations while remaining ever
vigilant of a child’s best interests. The Law Commission of
Canada presciently argued in its report, Beyond
70

Feinberg, supra note 13 at 815.

71

See Nicole Civita, “Cauldrons for Intimacy and Conduits of Care: The
Forms and Functions of Post-Marriage Families” (JD Paper,
Georgetown Law, 2007) [unpublished].

72

See Milton C Regan Jr, Family Law and the Pursuit of Intimacy (New
York: NYU Press, 1993) at 122, cited in Civita, ibid.
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Conjugality, 73 that individuals must be accorded the
maximum freedom to determine the relationships that
matter to them. “The state ought to support any and all
relationships that have the capacity to further relevant
social goals, and to remain neutral with respect to
individuals’ choice of a particular form or status.”74
Ultimately, the Court was convinced that it was in
Elaan’s best interests to have Lynda as a second parent and
we received an order on November 7, 2016 formally
declaring Lynda to be a parent of Elaan.75
PART III: ALL FAMILIES ARE EQUAL* (*MAY
NOT APPLY TO SOME FAMILIES)
Our legal victory was sweet, but in some ways short-lived.
While we personally received the result we needed, on
73

Law Commission of Canada, Beyond Conjugality: Recognizing and
Supporting Close Personal Adult Relationships (Ottawa: Law
Commission of Canada, 21 December 2001) at 18 [Beyond
Conjugality].

74

Ibid. See also Judith Stacy, “Toward Equal Regard for Marriages and
Other Imperfect Intimate Affiliations” (2003) 32:1 Hofstra L Rev 331.

75

The Court did not provide any reasons for its decision. Thus, our case
is not available on any legal database. We were simply given an order
that “Lynda Margaret Collins is a parent of the child, Elaan Das Bakht.
. . and that [she] shall be recognized in law as a parent of Elaan Das
Bakht pursuant to section 4 of the Children’s Law Reform Act.” Lynda
also received joint custodial rights together with Natasha regarding
major decisions about the care and upbringing of Elaan. The Deputy
Registrar General for the Province of Ontario was directed to amend
Elaan’s birth certificate to add Lynda as a parent pursuant to section 2
of Regulation 1094 under the Vital Statistics Act. See Vital Statistics
Act, RRO 1990, Reg 1094, s 2.
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December 5, 2016, the All Families are Equal Act received
royal assent. 76 The Honourable Yasir Naqvi, Attorney
General of Ontario, introduced the AFEA, explaining its
goal of treating all children equally and ending the
uncertainty parents face when their children are conceived
using assisted reproductive technologies. The AFEA
developed out of an earlier private member’s bill, which
never passed.77 The new Act, which made amendments to
the Children’s Law Reform Act, the Vital Statistics Act and
thirty-nine other statutes in Ontario, sought to address
several issues, including rules regarding the use and
reimbursement of surrogates, 78 pre-conception parentage
agreements, and was the first overhaul of antiquated
parentage laws in the province since 1978.
The intention of the legislation is certainly
progressive in that it attempts to dismantle the historically
presumed connection between biology and parentage and
recognizes to some extent that families may take different
forms. The new legislation is particularly significant in
providing clarity and certainty to LGBTQ parents who
conceive through assisted reproduction. 79 The AFEA
provides that the parents of a child conceived through
76

Bill 28, All Families Are Equal Act (Parentage and Related
Registrations Statute Law Amendment), 2nd Sess, 41st Leg, Ontario,
2016 (assented to 5 December 2016), SO 2016, c 23 [AFEA].

77

Bill 137, Cy and Ruby’s Act (Parental Recognition),1st Sess, 41st Parl,
Ontario, 2015 (referred to the Standing Committee on Regulations and
Private Bills 10 December 2015).

78

The scope of this paper does not allow an examination of these
provisions.

79

Assisted reproduction under AFEA “means a method of conceiving
other than by sexual intercourse”: AFEA, supra note 76, s 1(1).
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assisted reproduction are the birth parent and the birth
parent’s partner, if any, at the time of the child’s
conception. 80 This eliminates the need for the nonbiological parent to go to court to have his or her parental
status recognized in law using a declaration of parentage.
It also settles in advance the legal relationship of donors of
genetic material with respect to children born through
assisted reproduction. The AFEA also permits multiple
parents, up to four people, to be recognized without a court
order, if all parties entered into a written pre-conception
agreement to be parents of the child together.81
The new legislation is forward-looking in
recognizing that alternative families exist, permitting
parentage more easily in the context of conjugal same-sex
couples, nonconjugal parents and multiple-parent families.
However, while the purpose of the AFEA was to “create a
bill that puts what’s best for kids first—having a loving
family”, 82 ironically, the AFEA may foreclose the
possibility of courts exercising their parens patriae
jurisdiction to recognize certain non-normative families.

80

Ibid, s 8(1).

81

The birth parent is required to be one of the parties to this preconception agreement: ibid, s 9(2)(b). Section 9(4) of AFEA, ibid,
confirms that on the birth of a child contemplated by a pre-conception
parentage agreement, the parties to the agreement shall be recognized
in law to be parents of the child.

82

Ministry of the Attorney General, “About the All Families are Equal
Act,
2016”,
(29
November
2016),
online:
<https://news.ontario.ca/mag/en/2016/11/about-the-all-families-areequal-act-2016.html>.
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Under the AFEA, putative parents must form the
intention to parent before the child’s conception and that
intention must be formalized in a pre-conception
agreement. This requirement is coherent when one
considers that LGBT parents generally plan the birth of
their children and need to ensure certainty in this planning
process. But, the intention to parent pre-conception is not
the only way to ensure that children’s interests are put first.
Loving families can be and are created after a child’s birth.
Indeed, this is what step-parents, and those who “stand in
the place of a parent” as it is understood in the context of
child support, do regularly.83
Yet the AFEA specifically restricts the granting of
a declaration of parentage in certain situations.
Specifically, section 13(4) of the CLRA states that a court
shall not issue a declaration of parentage where:
1. A declaration of parentage. . . results in the
child having more than two parents;
2. A declaration of parentage. . . results in the
child having as a parent one other person,
in addition to his or her birth parent, if that
person is not a parent of the child under
section 7, 8 or 9 [who is not otherwise a
parent biologically, through a preconception parentage agreement, or by
virtue of being the spouse of a birth parent
where assisted reproduction is used].84
83

CFSA, supra note 35, s 158(2)(b). See also FLA, supra note 14, ss 1(1),
31; Family Law Act, SBC 2011, c 25, s 147(4) [FLA (BC)]; Divorce
Act, RSC 1985, c 3 (2nd Supp), s 2(2)(b).

84

AFEA, supra note 76, s 13(4) [emphasis added].
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Section 13(5) establishes the following
prerequisites for a declaration of parentage in the above
context:
1. The application for the declaration is made
on or before the first anniversary of the
child’s birth, unless the court orders
otherwise.
2. Every other person who is a parent of the
child is a party to the application.
3. There is evidence that, before the child was
conceived, every parent of the child and
every person in respect of whom a
declaration of parentage respecting that
child is sought under the application
intended to be, together, parents of the
child.
4. The declaration is in the best interests of
the child.85
In other words, these provisions preclude a
declaration of parentage where the intention to parent
arises after a child’s birth, even where such a declaration
may be in the child’s best interests.
The courts’ parens patriae jurisdiction is an
inherent power, arguably protected under section 96 of the
Constitution. The Supreme Court has held that courts have
an obligation to exercise it where necessary to protect the
best interests of children.86 However, the AFEA appears to
85

Ibid, s 13(5).

86

Beson v Director of Child Welfare (Nfld), [1982] 2 SCR 716 at 724, 30
RFL (2d) 438.
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at least attempt to fetter judicial discretion in this regard.
Section 3 states that the Act determines “parentage for all
purposes of the law of Ontario”87 and section 13(4) states
that a court “shall not issue a declaration of parentage”88 in
certain enumerated circumstances. This unusual step
appears to be an attempt to preclude the issuance of a
declaration of parentage under the parens patriae
jurisdiction. If so, the provision is perhaps open to
constitutional challenge, or may be ignored by judges who
are confident in their inherent power to make rulings based
on the parens patriae jurisdiction. Only time will tell.
An examination of the Hansard for the AFEA
reveals that some legislators were concerned about the
intention to parent restrictions placed on declarations of
parentage. The Honourable Cheri DiNovo disagreed with
the condition requiring the intention to parent to be
formalized prior to conception or before a child’s first
birthday, rather than allowing the best interests of the child
to govern. 89 The Honourable Catherine Fife expressed
similar concerns, noting that these provisions would
prevent third and fourth parents from being recognized90
where such parents formed the intention to parent after the

87

AFEA, supra note 76, s 3.

88

Ibid, s 13(4).

89

Ontario, Legislative Assembly, Official Report of the Debates
(Hansard), 41st Leg, 2nd Sess, No 11 (3 October 2016) at 1450 (Hon
Cheri DiNovo).

90

Ibid at 1540 (Hon Catherine Fife). The AFEA restricts the number of
parents to four where a pre-conception agreement is entered into. This
statutory limit on the number of parents is somewhat arbitrary.
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child’s birth. 91 The fact that these concerns were
contemplated by the legislature suggests that people who
are excluded from the AFEA by virtue of forming the intent
to parent after the child’s birth may not be able to use the
courts’ parens patriae jurisdiction. It would be very
difficult to establish a legislative gap where the debates
disclose that the legislature foresaw and considered such a
situation and deliberately decided to exclude such people
from parentage declarations.
While courts have noted that the existence of a
legislative gap is not the only justification for exercising
parens patriae jurisdiction, this is not a well-developed
area in the context of declarations of parentage. 92 The
possibility that section 97 of the Courts of Justice Act 93
91

The AFEA is faithful to the letter of the legal precedent set in A(A) v
B(B), supra note 29 that a child may legally have three parents and
perhaps even furthers the multiple parent scenario by permitting up to
four parents who are parties to a pre-conception agreement. However,
being faithful to the spirit of multiple parent families must also
recognize that such families may be created in more ways than one
(other than through an agreement pre-birth).

92

In CR v Children's Aid Society of Hamilton (2004), 8 RFL (6th) 285 at
para 125, Czutrin J held that the parens patriae jurisdiction does not
depend upon a legislative gap if the exercise of that jurisdiction is the
only way to meet the paramount objective of legislation. In that case,
the relevant legislation was the Child and Family Services Act, which
articulates the promotion of “the best interests, protection and well
being of children” as the paramount purpose of the Act: supra note 35,
s 1(1). While there is no “paramount objective” specifically articulated
in the CLRA as it pertains to declarations of parentage, in A(A) v B(B),
supra note 29, the Ontario Court of Appeal noted that the purpose of
the CLRA was to declare that all children should have equal status.

93

Section 97 of the Courts of Justice Act, RSO 1990, c C-43, states: “The
Court of Appeal and the Superior Court of Justice, exclusive of the
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could be used to make a binding declaration of right has to
date only proven useful to people seeking negative
declarations of parentage. 94 The only other avenue
available for such parent applicants would be a costly and
burdensome constitutional challenge to the AFEA.
A more flexible approach to declarations of
parentage would have been prudent, given family forms are
not set in stone, but constantly evolving. In British
Columbia, section 31 of the Family Law Act permits courts
to issue declarations of parentage “if there is a dispute or
any uncertainty as to whether a person is or is not a parent
under this Part”.95 This section of the FLA appears to leave
open the possibility that courts might grant declarations of
parentage in situations outside of those contemplated
explicitly under the Act or where there is a dispute about
who the parents are. Such a residual provision in Ontario
would have avoided excluding some families from an Act
that claims to be about the equality of all families.
It is hard to understand the reasons for the timing
restrictions on declarations of parentage in the AFEA as
none were alluded to in the legislative debates. Perhaps the
statutory limits were implemented to appease opponents
concerned about floodgates or to protect the autonomy of
intended parents from future interference, by drawing a
Small Claims Court, may make binding declarations of right, whether
or not any consequential relief is or could be claimed.”
94

In JR v LH (2002), 117 ACWS (3d) 276 (Ont Sup Ct J), Justice Kiteley
used section 97 of the Courts of Justice Act, ibid, to declare that the
gestational carrier or surrogate, who was not biologically related to the
twin children, and her husband were not parents of the children.

95

FLA (BC), supra note 83, s 31.
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legislative “bright line”. But the case law does not suggest
a stampede of adults seeking to parent children where they
are not obliged to do so. In fact, the reverse is true. Many
family law cases are about people trying to avoid their
parental duties, whether in the context of child support or
missed access visits.96 Even if people were clamoring to
parent children who already have parents, we are not
convinced this is necessarily a problem. An appropriate
feminist application of the best interests of the child
principle ought to be able to guide judicial decisions in
such cases. In some instances, excluding a putative second
(or subsequent) parent might serve both the best interests
of the child and maternal autonomy. In others, recognizing
an additional parent might improve the lives of both
mothers and children; in all cases, the custodial parent’s
views should be given very substantial weight and careful
consideration.
Though the AFEA was generally ameliorative
legislation, it was retrogressive in its restriction of the
Court’s ability to protect the best interests of a child on a
case-by-case basis where parentage might arise after birth.
The timing around when a parental relationship is created
is not a sound indicator of whether a particular relationship
is important to the best interests of a particular child. And
in the context of raising children with disabilities, a
situation that is typically only known after a child’s birth,
it may undermine efforts by people willing to create
atypical families in order to pool resources and care, to

96

See Fair v Fair, 2012 ONCA 900; Collins v Colling, 2017 ONSC
2232; Punzo v Punzo, 2016 ONCA 957, 90 RFL (7th) 304.
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raise these children in supportive, healthy, loving, and
flourishing environments.97
PART IV: NONCONJUGAL CO-PARENTING:
REVOLUTIONARY OR EVOLUTIONARY?
Numerous international and domestic legal instruments
delineate the rights of children to grow up in a loving
family.98 The right of children to be loved has also been
explored by philosopher S. Matthew Liao, who argues
“every able person in appropriate circumstances has a duty
to promote a child’s being loved even when the biological

97

For a similar argument in the adoption context in the United States see
Feinberg, supra note 13 at 802: “[S]ingle individuals whom the state
deems eligible to adopt on their own, but who choose not to because of
the great difficulties inherent in raising a child alone, may adopt if
allowed to do so jointly with a close friend.”
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For example, the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of the Child
states: “The child, for the full and harmonious development of his
personality, needs love and understanding. He shall, wherever
possible, grow up in the care and under the responsibility of his parents,
and, in any case, in an atmosphere of affection” United Nations,
Declaration of the Rights of the Child, GA Res 1386(XIV), UNGAOR,
14th Sess, Supp No 16, UN Doc A/4354 (1959) 19 at 20. The
Declaration of the Rights of the Child in Israel (1989) describes every
child as having “the rights to a family life—to nourishment, suitable
housing, protection, love and understanding”: Declaration of the
Rights
of
the
Child
in
Israel,
1989,
online:
<http://cms.education.gov.il/EducationCMS/Units/Pniyot/KavPatuah/
ZhuyotTalmid/ZahuyotEladimIsrael.html>, cited in Liao, supra note
50 at 1; The Children’s Charter of Japan (1951) declares that “All
children shall be entitled to be brought up in their own homes with
proper love”: Children’s Charter of Japan, 1951, online:
<http://www.s-keimei.or.jp/houritu.htm>, cited in Liao, supra note 50
at 1.
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parents are available.”99 Some parents (whether single or
partnered) may successfully discharge their duty to love
their children using only their own resources, with all this
entails in terms of funds, emotional and physical reserves,
and time. But many people may find this difficult without
assistance, owing to the demands of employment,
caregiving of other family members, the special needs of
some children or parents, mental health challenges, or other
factors. 100 That other persons also have duties 101 toward
children can alleviate the burdens on the primary
caregiver(s) and promote all children’s well-being.
Examples abound of care for children by people in addition
to biological parents.
In African American and Indigenous communities,
a network of people, in addition to biological mothers, have
often cared for and raised children. 102 Grandmothers,
99

Liao, supra note 50 at 134.

100

Ibid at 138.

101

Liao notes that other people who are not biological parents, but also
have the duty to love children need not do the same thing as parents to
fulfill their responsibilities. They might support better childcare
programs and more flexible workplace policies or pay taxes and vote
for governmental policies that help parents discharge their duties: ibid
at 138, 140.

102

See bell hooks, Feminist Theory: From Margin to Center, 2nd ed
(Cambridge, MA: South End, 2000) at 144; Patricia Hill Collins, Black
Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness, and the Politics of
Empowerment (New York: Routledge, 2000) at 45, 173. Sarah Morales
notes that historically in Coast Salish communities, grandparents or
great aunts and uncles raised children, especially the first born. Within
Hul’qumi’num family units, all the offspring of one’s aunts and uncles
are considered to be your brothers and sisters: Sarah Noël Morales,
Snuw’uyulh: Fostering an Understanding of the Hul’qumi’num Legal
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aunts, other relatives, and non-relatives who are treated like
family, have all been part of networks of care. Communitybased child care has historically been critical for Black
women who had to leave the home to work and provide for
their families.103 Where childcare is unaffordable or nonexistent, these other parents have played essential roles in
child rearing. In South Asian communities, multigenerational families are commonplace and numerous.
Non-biologically-related adults may function as “aunties”
and “uncles” to a child. 104 bell hooks described the
tradition of multiple parents and people who do not have
biological children sharing child rearing as “revolutionary
parenting.”105 She noted that it is revolutionary in that it
opposes the Western ideology that maintains that two

Tradition, (DCL Thesis, University of Victoria, Faculty of Law, 2014)
[unpublished] at 114.
103

hooks, supra note 102 at 144.

104

Indeed, it may be that Natasha was particularly open to becoming a
nonconjugal co-parent because she was raised in an immigrant Indian
and Pakistani community in Toronto in which the majority of her local
“extended family” were not biologically related to her. Lynda, in turn,
was raised in a blended family with four parents—two biological
parents and two step-parents who arrived at different points in her
childhood and brought with them step-siblings and a half-sibling. We
both learned through experience that love makes a family.

105

hooks, supra note 102 at 133. See also Adje van de Sande & Peter
Menzies, “Native and Mainstream Parenting: A Comparative Study”
(2003) 4:1 Native J Soc Work 126 at 129; Angela Mae Kupenda, “Two
Parents are Better Than None: Whether Two Single African American
Adults—Who Are Not in a Traditional Marriage or a Romantic or
Sexual Relationship with Each Other—Should Be Allowed to Jointly
Adopt and Co-Parent African American Children” (1997) 35:4 U
Louisville J Fam L 703 at 707.
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biological heterosexual parents, and in particular mothers,
should be raising children.106
The communal caring for children by numerous
people in addition to biological mothers, also known as
“alloparenting”, 107 may also be seen as evolutionary; the
practice dates as far back as the hunter-gatherer period.108
Anthropologist Sarah Blaffer Hrdy has argued that human
evolutionary history is characterized by cooperative
offspring care. She notes that homo sapiens could never
have evolved if human mothers had been required to raise
children on their own. Because infants are so dependent at
birth and remain so for years, mothers had to rely on social
supports extending beyond their own kin to raise their
young.109 Hrdy compellingly suggests that cooperation in
child care was crucial to human success in ancestral
hunting and gathering groups.110

106

See Bella DePaulo, “Why Friends Should Have Full Legal Rights as
Co-Parents”, (31 March 2017), Single at Heart with Bella DePaulo,
Ph.D. (blog), online: <blogs.psychcentral.com>.

107

The Oxford English Dictionary defines alloparent as “An adult animal
or person involved in parent-like care of an individual which is not his
or her offspring.”: The Oxford English Dictionary, sub verbo
“alloparent”.

108

Sarah Blaffer Hrdy, Mothers and Others: The Evolutionary Origins of
Mutual Understanding (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard
University Press, 2009) at 32.

109

Ibid at 270.

110

Ibid at 271.
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Contemporary permutations of alloparenting 111
likely also exist in abundance, though the area is arguably
understudied. One documented example concerns a remote
community in northern Tanzania, where the Kurya
Indigenous people have a longstanding tradition of
heterosexual women marrying each other in order to
preserve their homes and lifestyles without husbands. The
women live, cook, and raise children together, though they
are not lovers. Women may take male lovers, but any
resulting children are raised in the female marriage.112 This
practice has seen a resurgence recently, as women seek
more freedom and power.113 In Western societies, adults
are similarly seeking multiple paths to family formation,
including intentional nonconjugal parenting units.
In 2014, the New York Circuit Court heard an
uncontested second parent adoption application by two
friends who were co-parenting a child.114 The parties were
long time co-workers and friends. Although they were
“opposite-sex” co-parents, they did not live together and
111

“In a number of cultures, both within and outside the United States,
community members often come together to raise children, with
friends of the biological parents assuming a parental role in the child’s
life.”: Feinberg, supra note 13 at 802. See also Kupenda, supra note
105 at 712.

112

Coontz, supra note 12 at 26–27.

113

WITW Staff, “In Tanzania, Straight Women Are Marrying One
Another”, New York Times (2 August 2016), online:
<nytlive.nytimes.com/womenintheworld/2016/08/02/in-tanzaniastraight-women-are-marrying-one-another/>. See also Coontz, ibid at
27.

114

Matter of G, 251 NYLJ (3d) 26 (Sur Ct, NY County 2013) [Matter of
G].
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had never dated. The friends tried to have a child together
using assisted reproduction, however, they were not
successful in conceiving. They decided to adopt a child,
travelling together to Ethiopia for the adoption. Since the
parties were not married and could not legally adopt in
Ethiopia, they decided that the mother would adopt their
daughter on her own and wait until their return to New
York before bringing an application for a second parent
adoption. The parties also both agreed that if they were
unsuccessful in obtaining a second parent adoption, they
would continue to co-parent together informally. When the
child was two years old, the parties applied jointly for a
second parent adoption. The court interpreted section 110
of the Domestic Relations Law, which had been amended
to permit adoption by “any two unmarried adult intimate
partners together” 115 to include nonconjugal partners. In
her analysis, Justice Mella held that the 2010 amendment
to the Act, suggested the legislature intended for the phrase
to encompass more than just common law partners. Indeed,
the court stated, “the experience of jointly and intentionally
parenting a child is itself of the most intimate nature.”116

115

DOM § 110 (2014) [emphasis added].

116

Matter of G, supra note 114 at para 24. In Matter of A, 27 Misc 3d 304
(Fam Ct, Queens County 2010), the court permitted a paternal
grandmother and a paternal aunt to jointly adopt three children. The
mother and aunt lived together and were committed to each other and
to the three children. Similarly, in Matter of Chan, 37 Misc 3d 358 (Sur
Ct, NY County 2012), the prospective parent who had previously lived
with the mother and had been a “functional parent” but was not a
spouse or living with the mother in a conjugal relationship, established
that the adoption would be in the best interests of the child. However,
in the earlier case, Matter of Garrett, 17 Misc 3d 414 (Sur Ct, Oneida
County 2007), the court denied the joint petition adoption by a natural
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The judge was also satisfied that the child’s best interests
would be served by having her father recognized as a
parent given that the friends actually functioned as the
child’s parents and had created a nurturing family
environment.117
Many people are now connecting on co-parenting
websites such as Modamily 118 or Family By Design, 119
which offer opportunities to find co-parents as well as
resources for navigating the parenting partnership process.
This can include single people who want to have a child
and share responsibilities for raising the child together
without necessarily being in a romantic relationship. Some
have suggested that the decoupling of romance and
marriage from having children is a positive step that,
especially for women, removes the pressure to find the
right romantic relationship in order to become a parent.120
Indeed, single mothers by choice have also cited this
rationale for their mothering decisions.121

mother and her biological brother for him to become the child’s legal
father.
117

Matter of G, supra note 114 at para 6.

118

Modamily, online: <www.modamily.com>.

119
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120
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Pair up to Raise A Child”, CBC News (15 February 2017), online:
<www.cbc.ca/news>.
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See Rachel Lau, “Single Parent by Choice: Women Turn to Sperm
Donors to Conceive”, Global News (27 April 2017), online:
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In terms of stability, many people enter conjugal
relationships in search of the one person with whom they
expect to spend the rest of their lives. However, these
relationships arguably involve a greater chance of
dissolution than close friendships, which studies show are
often important, stable, intimate, and committed.122 “Many
women report feeling emotionally closer to their female
friends than to their husbands; and research shows that
women usually make a deep commitment and devote a
great deal of time and intensity to their friends.”123
This is not to suggest that nonconjugal co-parenting
units are superior to their more traditional counterparts.
Indeed, in our view, our case stands for the proposition that
there is no limit to the configurations of relationships that
can support the healthy raising of children. Natasha’s
decision to co-parent with Lynda after initially thinking she
would be a single mother by choice should not be taken as
a statement about the capacity of single mothers (or
fathers) to effectively raise children with or without
disabilities.124 Our co-parenting arrangement came about

122

See Feinberg, supra note 13 at 812. Among the Na community in the
Yunnan Province of southwestern China, brothers and sisters live
together in non-incestuous relationships, jointly raising, educating, and
supporting the children to whom the sister gives birth. “Among the Na,
sibling relationships are much more meaningful and long-lasting than
love affairs or sexual relationships. . . some of the sibling-based
households . . . remained together for ten or more generations, with
brothers and sisters practically inseparable—‘companions for life.’”:
Coontz, supra note 12 at 32–33.

123
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124

Indeed even “single mothers by choice typically rely on support
networks of various forms, refuting any notion that their autonomous
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organically and we felt that it worked for each of us—and
especially for Elaan. The most effective parenting requires
being flexible in form so as to be able to respond to all
parties’ needs and interests as they evolve.
Moreover, parenting does not occur in a vacuum.
Many people play crucial roles in a child’s life and parents
and children require ongoing support from multiple
sources. 125 This is especially the case for parents raising
children with complex disabilities. That nonconjugal coparenting has been a necessary part of our history and
continues to exist in more contemporary cultural practices
suggests that States, social agencies, and other institutions
should support conditions for all kinds of relationships that
further children’s right to be loved126 without reference to
conjugality. Regardless of the gender, dis/ability, sexual
orientation, race, religious background, biological
connection to the child, or marital status of the parent(s),
most families want what is best for their children. They

motherhood is conducted in splendid isolation.”: Boyd, supra note 10
at 15.
125

As we write this section of the paper, we are sitting in a hospital room
while our dear friend strokes Elaan’s hair to help him sleep. She has
become a significant support to both of us and yet another adult that
Elaan can rely on. Because parenting a child (certainly any child, but
especially one with complex disabilities) is so incredibly unpredictable
and time-consuming, we are ever grateful for all of the day-to-day care
we get from family, friends, our different communities, and
professional resources.

126
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want to be able to create a home or homes that are safe,
loving, and happy environments.127
CONCLUSION
The traditional family structure no longer reflects the
realities of modern day parenting. As same-sex couples,
single parents, blended families, and multiple parent
families have demonstrated, non-traditional families can
and do provide children with the love, support, and stability
they need to flourish. Family law recognizes and protects
many such non-traditional family compositions. Given this
shift in both society and family law, it makes little sense to
deny individuals the latitude to determine which important
relationships should be brought within the scope of law.128
We believe that our case shows that family law
ought to be steered in the direction that “exalts freedom,
honours commitment and encourages care.” 129 If family
policy explicitly privileges conjugal relationships or
nonconjugal relationships that are only formed in one
particular way (for example, before conception), it will fail
to offer much-needed support to more vulnerable families,
including those raising children with complex disabilities.
There was certainly a desperate need to restructure
parentage laws in Ontario, as the All Families are Equal
Act did. However, it ought not to have restricted the ability
of judges to determine when a novel family formation is in
127
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Journeys to Kinship (New York: NYU Press, 2015).

128
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129

Civita, supra note 71 at 12.
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the best interests of a child. We must leave open the
possibility for love to be imagined in ways we had not
anticipated. The interest in parenting partnerships may well
grow as the number of single people continues to
increase. 130 This may result in a rejuvenation of older
familial practices or new incarnations of parenting. What
ought to matter is the love and care that children have the
right to receive. As society acknowledges the ever-

130

See Bella DePaulo, “What Has Changed for Single Americans in The
Past Decade”, The Washington Post (20 September 2016), online:
<www.washingtonpost.com/news>; Claire Brownell, “They’re One of
Canada’s Fastest Growing Demographics, So Why Are Politicians
Ignoring The Single Voter?”, National Post (12 June 2015), online:
<news.nationalpost.com>.
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expanding cadre of family compositions,131 law should not
lag behind.132
131

The interest and fascination with non-traditional families is evident in
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Cal: Touchstone Home Entertainment, 2002); Kate and Allie—The
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involved the nonconjugal parenting by a brother and sister of an
orphaned girl, while the sequel chronicles the formation of another
family involving two women friends (Marilla and Rachel Lynde)
raising adopted children together. LM Montgomery, Anne of Green
Gables (Toronto: McGraw Hill Ryerson, 1968); LM Montgomery,
Anne of Avonlea (Toronto: McGraw Hill Ryerson, 1968).
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